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THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
ENHANCING GUN PENALTIES:
SHOOTING DOWN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
AND ARMING FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
SARA SUN BEALE†
INTRODUCTION
To deter gun violence and punish gun offenders, Congress—like
state legislatures—has repeatedly increased the penalties for illegal
gun possession and the use of guns in the commission of other crimes.
After several rounds of statutory increases, the penalties are now
much higher than penalties for criminal conduct that accompanies
gun possession and also very high relative to penalties for other seri-
ous offenses. By designating separate penalties for gun use, as high or
higher than the penalties for many of the most serious traditional of-
fenses, Congress has sent a deterrent message to would-be offenders
and sought to incapacitate those who will not be deterred. Whether
this message has been successful in altering the behavior of those who
might otherwise commit gun offenses is an empirical question that
other researchers are attempting to answer.1
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1. For a helpful review of the research, see Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent
and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for Improve-
ment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 41, 43–45 (2000) (concluding that as a whole firearms sentence en-
hancement laws “show little or no impact,” though enhancement laws have been “associated
with a decrease in some types of crimes in a few states”).
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Although Congress intended to alter the behavior of would-be
criminals or incapacitate them, it has created behavior-altering incen-
tives for other actors in the criminal justice system as well. This Essay
explores how the legislative attempts to crack down on gun violence
have affected the behavior of judges and prosecutors, and what legal
issues, outcomes, and concerns these attempts have generated.
In Part I, I explore how the pressure to enhance gun penalties
has affected the boundary between federal and state law, raising both
constitutional and prudential issues. I argue that this pressure was a
critical factor leading to a historic ruling limiting the constitutional
scope of federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause, as the Su-
preme Court responded to the potential for institutional damage to
the federal courts. At the administrative (or prosecutorial) level,
there has been pressure on the definition of the offenses in question,
as federal prosecutors have sought to construe these firearms statutes
broadly to secure enhanced sentences in a wider range of cases. As
the example of Richmond’s Project Exile reveals,2 these pressures
also have the potential to reshape the character of federal law en-
forcement.
In Part II, I explore the pressure gun-related penalties have
placed on a different boundary, the line defining the elements of an
offense. I argue that prosecutors have pressed vigorously for expan-
sive interpretations of the elements of the most commonly prosecuted
federal firearm offense, the felon-in-possession statute, to expand the
range of cases in which the enhanced penalties may be imposed. In an
unusual volume of litigation, prosecutors have successfully expanded
the effective scope of the statute. A review of prosecutorial practices
also reveals an apparently conflicting trend: federal prosecutors bar-
gain away or decline to bring charges under the enhanced penalties in
the majority of cases. Thus, enhancing the penalties available under
federal law and expanding the range of cases to which those penalties
apply also has enhanced the prosecution’s bargaining power and its
unchecked discretion in a wide range of cases.
I.  PRESSURE ON THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
One of the most obvious boundary lines affected by the pressure
to increase the punishment for gun crimes is the boundary separating
2. See infra Part I.B.
BEALE.DOC 05/17/02 4:41 PM
2002] ENHANCING GUN PENALTIES 1643
federal and state criminal law. The general police power is reserved to
the states; both constitutional design and tradition have narrowly
limited the scope of federal criminal law.3 Local crime has tradition-
ally been regarded as the province of the states, and federal criminal
jurisdiction has been the exception rather than the rule. In the last
third of the twentieth century, however, a plethora of new federal
criminal statutes strained the general principle of leaving the prosecu-
tion of local crime to the states.4 Some of the most significant statutes
extending the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction involve firearms
offenses—and some legislative proposals would expand jurisdiction
even further. These new laws, which make federal crimes of conduct
already illegal under state law, have generally been intended to im-
pose harsher penalties than those currently available under state law.
Section A begins by describing the legislative initiatives. Since
1968 Congress has pressed the policy and constitutional limits of fed-
eral jurisdiction in efforts to extend federal firearms provisions to a
broader range of violent crime under the Commerce Clause. The Su-
preme Court has responded to these legislative changes. In the main,
the Supreme Court’s gun-related decisions have involved statutory
construction. The Court repeatedly has read federal firearms legisla-
tion narrowly, thereby reducing its scope and impact. More impor-
tantly, the Court also issued its most important Commerce Clause
opinion in fifty years in a federal firearms case. Although each of
these decisions may be explained on other grounds, together they
suggest an institutional response by the Court to the threat that fed-
eralizing gun-related crime could swamp the federal courts and alter
their fundamental character.
As discussed in Section B, federal prosecutors also have pushed
the envelope by interpreting the firearms statutes expansively and by
using their charging discretion to accommodate a larger number of
firearms cases. Both legislative and executive activity directed at en-
hancing the sentences for gun offenders have expanded—and argua-
bly distorted—the traditional territory of federal criminal law.
3. For an account of the history of federal criminal law, see generally TASK FORCE ON
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW 5–12 (1998) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]; Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Ju-
risdiction, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 694 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2002).
4. In 1998, the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal
Law reported that more than forty percent of the federal criminal statutes adopted since the
Civil War have been enacted since 1970. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 7.
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A. Legislative Initiatives and Judicial Responses
The modern era of federal firearms legislation began in 1968 af-
ter the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr.
That year, Congress expansively employed its authority under the
Commerce Clause to reach a wide range of gun-related crime. For
present purposes, the most important provision of the 1968 legislation
made it a federal crime for a previously convicted felon to possess a
firearm.5 The Department of Justice interpreted the statute as ex-
tending federal jurisdiction to any felon who possessed a firearm—
with no showing required in individual cases of any connection to
interstate commerce or any other basis for federal jurisdiction—and
the lower courts accepted this interpretation.6 So interpreted, the
federal felon-in-possession statute and the loan-sharking statute also
enacted in 19687 were the first federal criminal statutes to employ the
class-of-activities model to assert criminal jurisdiction under the
Commerce Clause. In a pair of decisions in 1971, the Supreme Court
upheld the class-of-activities approach in the loan-sharking statute,8
but it finessed the issue in a case involving the felon-in-possession
statute. Noting that the lower courts’ interpretation of the felon-in-
possession statute would work a major change in the boundary
between federal and state law,9 the Supreme Court sidestepped the
constitutional and policy issues posed by this expansive reading of the
statute. Finding the statutory language and the legislative history
ambiguous, the Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity and declined
5. Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, §§ 1201–1203, 82 Stat. 197, 236–37 (repealed 1986) provided in pertinent part:
Any person who—
(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political
subdivision thereof of a felony . . . and who receives, possesses, or transports in
commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
6. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 338 (1971) (“The Government proceeded on
the assumption that § 1202 (a)(1) banned all possessions and receipts of firearms by convicted
felons, and that no connection with interstate commerce had to be demonstrated in individual
cases.”); id. at 338 n.3 (noting that five courts of appeals, with only one dissenting judge, ac-
cepted the government’s interpretation, and that only the Second Circuit and a few district
courts disagreed); see also Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited—The Federaliza-
tion of Interstate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 280–81 (1973) (discussing the government’s in-
terpretation).
7. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 159 (1968) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891–896 (2000)).
8. Bass, 404 U.S. at 338; Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154–57 (1971).
9. Bass, 404 U.S. at 349–50.
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to “assume that Congress meant to effect a significant change in the
sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.”10
The 1968 legislation thus illustrates either Congress’s willingness to
press its authority under the Commerce Clause to the limit to reach
felons who possess firearms,11 or the Justice Department’s zeal to in-
terpret an ambiguous statute in these terms, thereby raising both the
constitutional and interpretative question.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 1968 legislation typi-
fies its response to many of the federal firearms statutes. Despite the
Court’s strong law-and-order orientation in the last twenty-five years,
it has interpreted the various federal firearms statutes to restrict their
scope and impact.12 Several of these decisions are discussed in Part II.
More recently, Congress authorized federal criminal jurisdiction
over another class of activities—gun possession in a school zone—
pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce. The Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 made it a federal offense “for any individ-
ual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reason to believe, is a school zone.”13 A schoolboy’s
prosecution under this act prompted the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Lopez,14 the first Commerce Clause decision in more
than half a century striking down a federal statute. Lopez sent a
shock wave through both the judiciary and the academy, and set off
an enormous wave of litigation challenging a wide variety of other
federal criminal statutes, including other gun laws, on constitutional
10. Id.
11. For a discussion of the novelty of the class-of-activities legislation, see Stern, supra note
6, at 280–84.
12. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995) (holding that “use” under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) requires active employment); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994)
(holding that, in a prosecution under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) for possession of an unregistered fire-
arm, the government must prove the defendant knew his firearm had characteristics that
brought it within the statutory definition of a machine gun); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S.
398, 399–400 (1980) (finding that a sentence for § 924(c) may not be imposed in a prosecution
for assault on a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111, which provides for an enhanced sentence
when a defendant “uses” a deadly weapon); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 16 (1978)
(holding that a sentence for a § 924(c) violation may not be imposed in a prosecution for bank
robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113, which provides for an enhanced sentence when robbery is
committed “by the use of a dangerous weapon or device”). But see Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 566–67 (1977) (holding that proof that a firearm has traveled at some time
in interstate commerce is sufficient under 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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grounds.15 At first it appeared that Lopez might be “a derelict on the
waters of the law,”16 as the lower courts generally read the Supreme
Court’s decision narrowly and upheld the challenged laws.17 But five
years later the Supreme Court, following Lopez, struck down a key
provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in United
States v. Morrison.18 Lopez and Morrison provide a doctrine with
which the Supreme Court can prune back federal criminal jurisdic-
tion, particularly in cases involving conduct the Court deems non-
economic.19
In light of Congress’s efforts to saddle the federal courts with
many new criminal cases, positive political theory20 provides a con-
vincing explanation for a series of Supreme Court decisions culmi-
nating in Lopez and Morrison. Applying and adapting positive politi-
cal theory, William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have argued that the
Supreme Court should be understood as a rational, self-interested ac-
tor interacting with the other branches of government.21 Reviewing
the Court’s 1993 Term, they identified two criminal cases they believe
15. 1 SARAH N. WELLING, SARA SUN BEALE & PAMELA H. BUCY, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND RELATED ACTIONS: CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, AND RICO
§ 1.3(B)(iii) (1998 & Supp. 2000).
16. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“I feel
confident that the present decision will turn out to be an isolated deviation from the strong cur-
rent of precedents––a derelict on the waters of the law.”).
17. WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, supra note 15, § 1.3(B)(iii). See generally Glenn H. Rey-
nolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What If the Supreme Court
Held a Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WISC. L. REV. 369 (“[L]ower courts have tended to
limit Lopez to its facts . . . .”).
18. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause—and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—in enacting the civil
cause of action under the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981).
19. For a discussion of Morrison and its likely impact on federal criminal jurisdiction, see
WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, supra note 15, § 1.3 (iv)–(v) (2000 Supp.). The four dissenters in
Morrison argued that “[t]he ‘economic/noneconomic distinction’ is not easy to apply.” 529 U.S.
at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20. There is considerable disagreement on the precise contours of positive political theory,
especially as it relates to public choice. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:
Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 458–63 (1992) (describing varying
views). Farber and Frickey conclude that positive political theory “consists of non-normative,
rational-choice theories of political institutions.” Id. at 462 (emphasis omitted). For an earlier
positive-political-theory reading of Lopez, see generally Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings
and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 757 (1996).
21. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Fore-
word: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28–29 (1994); see also Friedman, supra note
20, at 776 (arguing that positive political theory “presumes that institutions, or at least institu-
tional actors, have policy preferences and that political institutions act rationally in a manner
calculated to advance those preferences”).
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departed from the Court’s normal rules of statutory interpretation to
signal “the Court’s extreme displeasure with Congress.”22 As Eskridge
and Frickey noted, “From the standpoint of political theory, we
should expect the Court to react with hostility when Congress loads
up the dockets of the already-swamped federal courts with criminal
cases, which must receive priority scheduling, especially when the
crimes have no special national significance or regulatory interest.”23
Eskridge and Frickey concluded that the decisions in question are
“difficult to square” with the Court’s rule-of-law values, and that the
decisions demonstrate the importance the Court places on the values
of “federalism and . . . the business of the federal judiciary.”24 Writing
one year before Lopez, they summed up the Court’s response to the
increasing federalization of crime:
In this area, the Court and Congress are at loggerheads, and the
Court may feel that it must communicate its concern to Congress
clearly . . . . [I]n this area the Court is an active opponent of Con-
gress and seems to be throwing up what roadblocks it can. In addi-
tion, because there are few interest groups to derail feel-good, do-
something federal crime bills, the Court may sense that it alone is
left to confront Congress.25
Other observers have suggested that the federal courts had a
second institutional interest at stake when Congress sought to enlarge
the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction: status and dignity. These
dignity concerns, it is suggested, caused the federal judiciary (and its
supporters) to distinguish sharply between the cases of national im-
port that should be heard in the federal courts and the ordinary street
crimes historically prosecuted in the state courts.26
22. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at 69–70 (discussing Staples v. United States, 510
U.S. 600 (1994) and Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994)).
23. Id. at 70.
24. Id. at 70–71.
25. Id. at 71.
26. E.g., Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029,
1055–61 (1995); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 967–95 (2000). As Professor Resnik’s historical discussion
establishes, the sense of the elevated mission of the federal courts and the concern that they
could be deluged by a large number of minor cases are not new. See also Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of the Lower Federal
Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 708–09 (1999) (quoting a letter written in 1924 by a fed-
eral district judge who lamented the loss of the “dignity and honor” of the federal bench, and
stated that due to the influx of Prohibition cases and “new” immigration, the federal courts ap-
peared to be police courts).
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Workload and dignity concerns combined in claims that the fed-
eral courts were in danger of becoming “police courts.”27 Use of the
term “police court”28 raised the specter of high-volume urban courts
where vast numbers of cases are processed in an assembly-line fash-
ion reminiscent of traffic court,29 where individual adjudication is im-
possible, and where due process exists more in theory than in prac-
tice.30 Thus, status or dignity concerns, intertwined with workload
27. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Federal War on Drugs: Time for a Reality Check?, 14
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 179, 185 (1997) (arguing that “[f]ederal courts are increasingly police
courts, while antitrust and employment discrimination laws are being enforced by arbitrators
who are not accountable for their fidelity to law”); Proceedings of the Western Regional Con-
ference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 155 F.R.D. 233, 290 (1993) (noting that “lead-
ers of the organized bar tend to support the federal judges who decry the trend to turn federal
courts into police courts”); Sanford H. Kadish, Comment, The Folly of Overfederalization, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1247, 1250–51 (1995) (citing former American Bar Association [ABA] President
Robert Raven and Judge Judith Keep, who describe how the federal district court in San Diego
is “‘sinking in a mire of criminal cases’ that has turned it largely into a ‘police court’ where
judges are under ‘constant pressure to keep cases moving as fast as possible’”).
28. Technically, a police court (also called a magistrate’s court) has trial jurisdiction over
only minor criminal offenses, as well as “the power to bind over for trial persons accused of
more serious offenses.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 359 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “magistrate’s
court” under “court”).
29. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1170 n.186 (1995) (arguing that federal drug policies risk
turning “federal courts into police courts that dispense assembly line justice”).
30. A sense of what the term “police court” implies can be gleaned from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In a passage describing the adju-
dication of misdemeanors and petty crimes, and referring to “police courts,” the Court quoted
the following passage from the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice:
An inevitable consequence of volume that large is the almost total preoccupation in
such a court with the movement of cases. The calendar is long, speed often is substi-
tuted for care, and casually arranged out-of-court compromise too often is substituted
for adjudication. Inadequate attention tends to be given to the individual defendant,
whether in protecting his rights, sifting the facts at trial, deciding the social risk he
presents, or determining how to deal with him after conviction. The frequent result is
futility and failure. As Dean Edward Barrett recently observed:
“Wherever the visitor looks at the system, he finds great numbers of defendants
being processed by harassed and overworked officials. Police have more cases
than they can investigate. Prosecutors walk into courtrooms to try simple cases
as they take their initial looks at the files. Defense lawyers appear having had no
more than time for hasty conversations with their clients. Judges face long cal-
endars with the certain knowledge that their calendars tomorrow and the next
day will be, if anything, longer, and so there is no choice but to dispose of the
cases.
“Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the criminal process,
there is scant regard for them as individuals. They are numbers on dockets,
faceless ones to be processed and sent on their way. The gap between the theory
and the reality is enormous.
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concerns, gave the Supreme Court an institutional interest in oppos-
ing congressional federalization of crime, particularly low-status,
high-volume crimes.
A few months after the publication of Eskridge and Frickey’s ar-
ticle, Congress considered—and came within a hair’s breadth of
adopting—a proposal to expand federal jurisdiction over gun-related
crime to unprecedented levels. In the early 1990s, Senator Alfonse
D’Amato began to champion the idea of making every crime commit-
ted with a gun that had crossed state lines a federal offense.31 Because
firearms are made in only a few locations and most are shipped across
state lines, this proposal would have extended federal jurisdiction to
nearly every one of the 900,000 gun offenses that occur each year in
the United States.32 The 900,000 potential federal offenses dwarfed
the total federal criminal caseload at that time, which was less than
50,000 cases.33 Opponents in the Senate argued that this proposal
would require quadrupling the number of federal judges, the number
of federal prosecutors, and the FBI’s budget.34 D’Amato predicted
that the number of prosecutions and the burden on the system would
be far lower, but he also stated his willingness to enlarge the Justice
Department and federal courts as necessary to “get these violent
predators off the streets.”35 Senator D’Amato also proposed legisla-
“Very little such observation of the administration of criminal justice in opera-
tion is required to reach the conclusion that it suffers from basic ills.”
Id. at 34–35 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967)).
Problems of this nature still exist. A more recent report evaluating the New York City
Criminal Court found that the court performed “a largely clerical role, moving cases rather than
dispensing justice,” trying only 0.4% of cases, and providing no more than the packaging of the
due process model, empty of contents. Harry I. Subin, The New York City Criminal Court: The
Case for Abolition 4–5 (Center for Research in Crime and Justice, New York University School
of Law, Occasional Papers No. XII, 1992).
31. See 139 CONG. REC. 28,223–24 (1993) (proposing amendment 1147, which would create
a new federal offense of murder with a firearm that has traveled in interstate or foreign com-
merce and an amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to include possession or use of a firearm during
and in connection with a state crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime); 137 CONG. REC.
16,830 (1991) (proposing an amendment to the Guns and Violence Against Women Act of 1991
to create a federal offense of committing a crime with a firearm that has crossed state lines).
32. 140 CONG. REC. 11,178 (1994) (statement of Sen. Biden).
33. Id. at 11,180 (noting that the federal criminal caseload was then 48,366).
34. E.g., id.
35. Id. at 11,181 (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (arguing that the caseload would likely in-
crease by 2,300 rather than 30,000; noting that if the caseload increased by 30,000, local prosecu-
tors could be cross-designated; and concluding that “whatever the increase in judges is necessary
to keep our judicial system from breaking down, this Senator will vote for it. The same with
prosecutors, the same with prisons”).
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tion making it a federal crime punishable by death to commit a mur-
der with a handgun that had traveled in interstate or foreign com-
merce.36 D’Amato’s proposals passed in the Senate in 1991,37 but the
bill in question died when Senate cloture motions repeatedly failed.38
In 1994, the Senate again passed the D’Amato proposals39 as amend-
ments to the bill that ultimately became the Violent Crime and Law
Enforcement Act.40 Although both the House and the Senate voted to
instruct their conferees to insist on the inclusion of these provisions,41
the conferees omitted the provisions, and the Senate accepted the
House version, which did not contain the D’Amato proposals.42
The federal judiciary vigorously opposed Senator D’Amato’s
proposals. In 1991, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote to Con-
gress to express the Judicial Conference’s opposition.43 The Chief Jus-
36. 139 CONG. REC. 28,222–24 (1993) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (proposing amend-
ment 1147).
37. See 137 CONG. REC. 16,561 (1991) (passing an amendment creating a federal offense of
murder involving a firearm by a vote of 65-33); id. at 16,835 (passing an amendment creating a
federal offense of use, possession, or carrying a firearm during and in relation to any state crime
of violence or drug-trafficking offense by a vote of 88-11).
38. Cloture motions on the conference report failed in the Senate on November 27, 1991,
and on March 19 and October 2, 1992. Id. at 36,128; 138 CONG. REC. 6,127 (1992); id. at 30, 287.
39. See 139 CONG. REC. 28,246 (1993) (approving the D’Amato amendment by a vote of
58-42).
40. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
41. See 140 CONG. REC. 11,179 (1994) (D’Amato motion); id. at S6099 (Biden summary of
D’Amato motion); id. at 11,195 (passing D’Amato motion by a vote of 51-47); id. at 17,235 (in-
troducing the McCollum motion, which instructed House managers not to agree to any provi-
sion not including § 2405 of the Senate amendment, which would make it a federal crime to use
or possess a firearm during a state crime of violence or drug trafficking); id. at 17,238 (agreeing
to McCollum motion by a vote of 291-128).
42. H. R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-711 (1994); H. R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-694 (1994). Senator
D’Amato voted against the conference report. 140 CONG. REC. 24,114–15 (1994) (Vote No.
295).
43. The Chief Justice, writing in his capacity as presiding officer of the Judicial Conference,
submitted to Congress the following statement:
The Judicial Conference of the United States opposes legislation adopted by the Sen-
ate which would expand federal criminal law jurisdiction to encompass homicides and
other violent state felonies if firearms are involved. Such expansion of federal juris-
diction would be inconsistent with long-accepted concepts of federalism, and would
ignore the boundaries between appropriate state and federal action.
The addition to federal jurisdiction of virtually any crime committed with a firearm
that has crossed a state line will swamp the federal courts with routine cases that
states are better equipped to handle, and will weaken the ability of the federal courts
effectively to deal with difficult criminal cases that present uniquely federal issues.
Not only will bona fide federal criminal prosecutions suffer if the Senate’s expansive
firearms provisions are adopted, but federal courts, overburdened by criminal cases,
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tice also highlighted his opposition in his 1991 report on the federal
courts,44 arguing that federalizing these crimes would have been “in-
consistent with long-accepted concepts of federalism, . . . would have
swamped federal prosecutors, thus interfering with other federal
criminal prosecutions, and would have ensured that the already over-
burdened federal courts could not provide a timely forum for civil
cases.”45 The Chief Justice made similar comments in various public
statements throughout the period that the D’Amato proposals were
under consideration in Congress.46 In 1994, testifying before the Sen-
will be unable to carry out their vital responsibilities to provide timely forums for civil
cases.
140 CONG. REC. 11,177–78 (1994) (reprinting the letter dated Sept. 19, 1991, and the enclosed
statement). For an interesting article identifying the federal judiciary’s institutional interests and
suggesting that it should not lobby Congress about jurisdictional provisions, see Lauren Robel,
Impermeable Federalism, Pragmatic Silence, and the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 71
IND. L.J. 841 (1996).
44. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Chief Justice Addresses ABA Midyear Meeting, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1992, at
1–2 (describing Rehnquist’s remarks opposing the D’Amato amendment—which he noted did
not pass in the prior year but “may resurface”); William H. Rehnquist, Convocation Address,
Wake Forest University (Oct. 25, 1994), in 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1002–05 (1994) (de-
scribing the extension of federal criminal jurisdiction in the 1994 crime bill and noting his own
doubts “as to the wisdom of some of these provisions”); William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass
Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, Address Before the University of Wisconsin Law
School (Sept. 15, 1992), in 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1, 6–7 [hereinafter Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass]:
Most federal judges have serious concerns about the numbers and types of crimes
now being funnelled into the federal courts. They question the appropriateness of
handling “street crimes” formerly handled in the state systems; they note the impact
on their civil caseloads; and they point to the serious drain on the judiciary’s re-
sources. On the other hand, federalization of crimes has had enormous political ap-
peal over the past decade, and hardly a congressional session goes by without an at-
tempt to add new sections to the federal criminal code. The attorney general has
made increased federal criminal prosecutions a centerpiece of his crime-fighting pol-
icy. Although the judiciary successfully opposed proposals last session that would
have federalized virtually any murder committed with a firearm, similar proposals are
likely to resurface. Continuation of the current trend toward large-scale federaliza-
tion of the criminal law has the enormous potential of changing the character of the
federal judiciary. Therefore, the Long Range Planning Committee hopes that there
will be wide-scale debate over two important questions: What should be required to
make an offense a federal crime?; and Should certain categories of criminal offenses
now prosecuted in the federal courts more appropriately be shifted to the state
courts?
William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal Judicial
Relationships, Address Before the National Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships
(Apr. 10, 1992), in 78 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1992) (calling for “congressional self-restraint . . .
in the federalization of crimes” and citing the D’Amato amendment as an example of the “re-
cent tendency to federalize crimes for essentially political reasons without recognizing the im-
pact federalization would have on the federal courts”).
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ate Appropriations Committee, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed
concern that the D’Amato proposals would turn the federal judiciary
into “police courts.”47 Justice David Souter noted that a significant
expansion of the federal courts’ criminal jurisdiction could incapaci-
tate the courts.48 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which
opposed the D’Amato proposals, estimated that their enactment
would generate 200,000 new cases in the federal system.49 Opponents
in the House argued that the proposals “would create chaos in the
Federal courts.”50 The attorney general and the United States Sen-
tencing Commission also opposed the D’Amato proposals.51
Majorities in both houses, however, appeared to support the
D’Amato proposals when Lopez was decided, and the Court could
anticipate that similar proposals would be introduced in the future
47. 140 CONG. REC. 11,183 (1994) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (noting that in their ap-
pearances before the Appropriations Committee, Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter opposed
the idea of expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a manner that would turn them
“into police courts”). All of the reports of the hearings attribute the statement about police
courts to Justice Kennedy, who picked up on Senator Hollings’s use of that term. E.g., Mary
Deibel, Justices Fear Effects of Crime Legislation; Federal Courts Could Become “Police
Courts,” S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 4, 1994, at A9; Scripps Howard, Crime Bills Could Create Federal
“Police Courts,” Justices Warn Congress, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 1994, at A6; Don’t Overload
U.S. Courts, Justices Urge Senate Panel, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Mar. 4, 1994, at 1
[hereinafter Don’t Overload]. Justices Anthony Kennedy and David Souter expressed similar
concerns in 1998. See, e.g., Steve Lash, Federal Criminal Code Shouldn’t Be Widened, Justices
Tell Congress, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 12, 1998, at A15 (reporting the Justices’ warning that
more federal laws criminalizing local crime would overburden the federal courts).
48. Justice Souter stated, “I’m afraid I don’t have very much optimism that federal courts
can become courts of unlimited criminal jurisdiction without incapacitating the ability of those
courts to do what they do well now.” Don’t Overload, supra note 47, at 1.
49. 140 CONG. REC. 17,234 (1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
50. Id. (statement of Rep. Hughes); see also Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a
Comparative Vision to Substantially Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary:
A Preliminary Blueprint for Remodeling Our National Houses of Justice and Establishing a
Separate System of Federal Criminal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 626 (1996) (quoting
a memorandum from Judge Maryanne Trump Barry describing the efforts of Representative
Hughes to defeat the D’Amato proposals using ammunition provided by the Judicial Confer-
ence).
51. Representative Hughes stated that
[t]he administration strongly opposes the Senate provisions which would largely
obliterate the distinction between Federal and State criminal jurisdiction. These pro-
visions represent a false promise of action in fighting violent crime, a promise that
will not be realized given limited Federal resources. . . . [A]t best these provi-
sions would be ineffectual; at worst, they would divert Federal resources from dealing
with distinctively Federal matters in interstate crime, activities that Federal law en-
forcement is uniquely competent to handle.
140 CONG. REC. 17,234 (1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes) (quoting a letter from the attorney
general). The Sentencing Commission concluded that the D’Amato proposals would increase
the federal prison population by 383.9% over the next nine years. Id.
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with a good chance of enactment.52 From the Supreme Court’s per-
spective, these proposals threatened to overload the federal courts
and undermine their prestige. Although the efforts to expand federal
jurisdiction over gun-related crime were not the only factor, I believe
they played a significant and critical role in motivating the Court to
announce the first modern judicial limitations on federal authority
under the Commerce Clause.53
The Chief Justice’s opposition to the D’Amato proposals was a
harbinger of his opinion for the Court in Lopez54 as well as of his later
opinion in Morrison.55 Writing for the Lopez majority, the Chief Jus-
tice emphasized the need to keep the traditional balance between
federal and state law, “between what is truly national and what is
truly local.”56 Without setting forth any “precise formulations,” the
majority declined to follow a chain of inferences regarding effects on
commerce that would allow Congress to regulate “all violent crime”57
as well as “activities that might lead to violent crime.”58 The Chief Jus-
tice returned to this theme in Morrison, the Court’s second decision
limiting the commerce power, in which it followed and extended Lo-
pez to hold that the civil provisions of VAWA exceeded Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause (and under the Fourteenth
Amendment).59 Morrison was not a firearms case,60 but the domestic
violence focus of VAWA (often associated with the low-status family
and police courts) triggered the same institutional response that mo-
tivated the Lopez decision. Although Morrison concerned the civil
rather than the criminal provisions of VAWA, the Chief Justice’s
opinion in Morrison emphasized that VAWA as a whole was an at-
52. See Chief Justice Addresses ABA Midyear Meeting, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that
Rehnquist commented in 1992 that, although the D’Amato amendment had not passed, it “may
resurface”); Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass, supra note 46, at 7 (noting that proposals such as the
D’Amato proposal to federalize virtually any murder committed with a firearm “are likely to
resurface”).
53. This point also has been made by Barry Friedman, supra note 20, at 796 (citing my re-
marks at the Case Western Reserve symposium). See also Williams, supra note 50, at 631 (char-
acterizing Lopez as a case in which the majority “took the policy, and the law, into their own
hands . . . to ensure that their elite federal courts would not become police courts”).
54. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
55. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
56. 514 U.S. at 567–68.
57. Id. at 564.
58. Id.
59. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
60. The complaint in Morrison alleged that the plaintiff was raped by fellow students at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Id. at 602.
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tempt to encroach on the traditional power of the states to regulate
criminal conduct under their police powers. Speaking for the Court,
Rehnquist wrote,
The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not di-
rected at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in inter-
state commerce has always been the province of the States. . . . In-
deed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which
the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims.61
In Lopez and Morrison, the Rehnquist-led majority served no-
tice that the federal courts cannot be transformed into police courts.
From the viewpoint of positive political theory, Lopez and Morrison
reshaped Commerce Clause doctrine to protect the traditional role of
the federal courts from the irreparable damage that could be inflicted
by “feel-good do-something federal crime bills.”62 Because gun-
related crime makes up such a large portion of the state courts’
caseload, a proposal to federalize a broadly defined class of crimes in-
volving firearms would necessarily work a radical change in the fed-
eral courts by either crowding out cases that traditionally have made
up the federal courts’ docket in favor of low-status police court cases
or requiring an enlargement of the courts that might hamper their ef-
fectiveness and lower their prestige.63 Similar institutional interests
were also present in Morrison. Although the volume of cases that
could fall within the civil provisions of VAWA was limited, the sub-
ject matter was a form of extremely common criminal activity associ-
ated with the low-status family courts or criminal courts. Indeed, the
Judicial Conference and the Chief Justice had publicly opposed the
provisions later struck down in Morrison on the ground that they
“could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations
disputes.”64
61. Id. at 618.
62. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at 71.
63. The relatively small number of federal judgeships and the specialized nature of the fed-
eral courts are significant factors in their prestige, and a limitation on the number of judgeships
is also required by the courts’ pyramidal three-tier system. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM.,
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
7–8 (1990).
64. Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the
Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 271 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Pro-
grammatic Judiciary] (quoting Rehnquist, supra note 44, at 3); see also Judith Resnik, “Natu-
rally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682,
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Pressure from gun cases was not, of course, the only factor moti-
vating the Lopez and Morrison decisions. These cases are also part of
a broader effort by the Court’s majority to restrict federal power in
favor of state authority, as reflected in decisions limiting federal
authority to subject states to suit in federal court or commandeer
state officials.65 But the Rehnquist majority’s institutional concerns
regarding the federalization of certain kinds of criminal cases explains
the timing of the Court’s first effort in half a century to limit the
commerce power, the choice of the two cases in which those limita-
tions were announced, and the limited application of those decisions.
It also makes sense of the Court’s failure to follow Lopez in cases that
do not raise the same concerns, including civil cases66 and criminal
1687–88 (1991) (noting the Judicial Conference’s concern that the legislation would “‘embroil
the federal courts in domestic relations disputes’ and ‘flood [the federal courts] with cases that
have been traditionally within the province of the state courts’”) (quoting Report of the Judicial
Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence 1, 7 (Sept. 1991) (on file with Judith
Resnick)). The Judicial Conference later dropped its opposition when the text of VAWA was
amended to respond to some of the judicial objections, the leadership of the Judicial Confer-
ence committee shifted, and judges themselves were subject to lobbying. Resnik, Programmatic
Judiciary, supra, at 273 & n.17.
65. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding
that a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act that authorizes private damage actions
against states violates the Eleventh Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91
(2000) (striking down a provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act authorizing
private damage actions against a state without its consent as violative of the Eleventh Amend-
ment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that a provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act authorizing private damage actions against states without their consent violates
the Eleventh Amendment); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding that the Commerce Clause, Patent Clause, and Fourteenth
Amendment were insufficient to provide Congress with the authority to abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933–34 (1997) (holding that the obliga-
tion imposed by the Brady Act to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchas-
ers placed an unconstitutional obligation on state officers to execute federal law); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (finding that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act’s “take title” provision, requiring states to accept ownership of waste or regulate according
to the instructions of Congress, lies outside Congress’s enumerated powers and is inconsistent
with the Tenth Amendment). For commentary on these decisions, see, for example, Ruth
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 86–87 (2001) (“We are
disturbed by the Court’s emerging vision in which Congress has substantially diminished powers
to conduct its internal affairs or to engage in factfinding and lawmaking that the judicial branch
will respect.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Princi-
ple?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2181, 2182–83 (1998) (criticizing Printz as unstable and impractical).
66. As noted above, Morrison involved the provision of VAWA that created a private civil
damage action. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. Otherwise the Court has not ap-
plied Lopez to civil provisions. The Court controls its own caseload, and it apparently has not
taken civil cases in which the issue was whether Congress had exceeded its jurisdiction under
the Commerce Clause. It did, however, rely upon the significant constitutional issues raised in
Lopez and Morrison as a justification for reading the Federal Pollution Control Act narrowly in
Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001).
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cases that fall within more traditional conceptions of federal criminal
jurisdiction. For example, less than a week after the Lopez decision,
the Court declined an opportunity to develop the themes initiated in
that opinion. In United States v. Robertson,67 the Ninth Circuit had
ruled that a small gold mine in Alaska lacked sufficient effect on
commerce to support jurisdiction under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).68 The Court granted certiorari on
the question of the necessary degree of effect on commerce,69 but fi-
nessed this issue in a brief per curiam opinion holding that it was un-
necessary to define the scope of the required effect on commerce be-
cause the gold mine was operating in interstate (as opposed to
intrastate) commerce.70
Positive political theory provides a ready explanation for the
Court’s quite different response to this organized crime case decided
just one week after Lopez, a garden-variety gun case. Organized
crime prosecutions fall within the traditional conception of the dis-
tinctive federal role in law enforcement, and RICO has never gener-
ated a large number of criminal prosecutions.71 High-profile, complex
organized crime prosecutions do not have the feel of police court
cases.
Two interconnected questions arise in regard to the Court’s resis-
tance to expanding federal criminal jurisdiction. First, why does the
self-interest of the Supreme Court—as opposed to the lower federal
courts—favor reducing the volume of federal criminal litigation? An
increased number of cases might overburden the lower federal courts
and reduce the prestige of judgeships on those courts, but the Su-
preme Court has virtually unlimited authority to determine the size of
67. 15 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 1994).
68. Id. at 868–69.
69. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, at i, United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995) (No.
94-251) (stating that the question presented was “[w]hether the interstate movement of goods
and people in connection with the operation of a gold mine is sufficient to justify the conclusion
that the activities of the gold mine affect interstate commerce within the meaning of the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act”).
70. Robertson, 514 U.S. at 671.
71. To be sure, commentators and lower courts have expressed concern about the civil
caseloads generated by RICO, but the Supreme Court has seemed largely unmoved by these
concerns, repeatedly reversing appellate decisions interpreting RICO in a fashion that would
make it more difficult to bring garden-variety civil suits within RICO’s ambit. The most out-
standing example is Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Although it recognized
that the court of appeals had imposed this limitation in response to the perception that civil
plaintiffs were misusing RICO, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs were not required to
show a distinct racketeering injury to recover treble damages under RICO. Id. at 495–97.
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its caseload. Whatever the impact on the lower courts, the Supreme
Court cannot be overburdened by the expansion of federal criminal
(or civil) jurisdiction. Nonetheless, as illustrated by their reaction to
the D’Amato proposals, the Justices and particularly the Chief Justice
have adopted the perspective of the federal courts as a whole, rather
than that of the Supreme Court.
The second question is why, in favoring its own institutional in-
terests and prestige, the Court does not seek to expand the caseload
of the federal judiciary?72 In general, institutional actors seek to ex-
pand their authority, or turf.73
Two possible explanations have occurred to me, one based on
prestige and one on policy preferences. One form of prestige involves
not extending turf, but rather remaining small and exclusive. An in-
creased number of cases might overburden the lower federal courts
and reduce the prestige of judgeships on those courts. Although the
Supreme Court has virtually unlimited authority to determine the size
of its docket, the Supreme Court may have adopted exclusivity over
expansive jurisdiction in part because of the Chief Justice’s role as the
head of the Judicial Conference. In this position, the Chief Justice
presents to Congress the views of the federal judiciary as a whole,
rather than the views of the Supreme Court.74 Although the Chief Jus-
tice presides over the Judicial Conference, judges from the lower fed-
eral courts otherwise comprise the Conference.75 Thus the experi-
ences and preferences of influential members of the lower federal
courts heavily influence the Chief Justice’s institutional perspective.76
72. Professor Vicki Jackson suggested this provocative question at a Georgetown work-
shop. Judith Resnik also notes that as a rational actor, the federal judiciary might seek ex-
panded jurisdiction to have “increases in judicial person-power.” Resnik, supra note 26, at 967–
68.
73. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 38–41 (1971) (asserting that regulators prefer to expand the number of transac-
tions subject to their regulation); cf. DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 6–9 (1997) (describing committee efforts to extend jurisdic-
tion).
74. The Chief Justice is required by 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) to “submit to Congress an an-
nual report of the proceedings of the Judicial Conference and its recommendations for legisla-
tion.” During Warren Burger’s term as Chief Justice, he adopted the practice, continued by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, of making an annual “State of the Judiciary” address. Resnik, Pro-
grammatic Judiciary, supra note 64, at 270 & n.3.
75. The Judicial Conference consists of the chief judge of each of the twelve judicial cir-
cuits, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial
circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 331.
76. Note, however, that in other respects the Chief Justice exercises a great deal of influ-
ence within the Judicial Conference. The Chief Justice selects the members of the Judicial Con-
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To the extent that the Chief Justice played a dominant role in Lopez
and Morrison—in which he wrote both opinions—his role as head of
the Judicial Conference might have been quite significant.
Perhaps more important, the institutional perspective of each
branch coexists with individuals’ policy preferences. As manifested in
many other cases, the Justices who made up the majority in Lopez
and Morrison prefer restricting the size and influence of the federal
government in favor of the states.77 Some or all of these Justices also
may have little sympathy for the groups seeking redress under
VAWA,78 or they may oppose federal regulation of firearms.79 Indi-
vidual Justices’ policy preferences would likely make them receptive
to concerns of overburdening the lower courts and diluting their elite
role.
Positive political theory also raises the question whether there
should be additional restraints on the courts’ self-interested actions.
The Chief Justice’s opposition to the D’Amato proposals was not an
isolated occurrence. As Judith Resnik demonstrates, the Judicial
Conference has become increasingly involved in lobbying Congress in
favor of institutional recommendations about the scope of the federal
courts’ jurisdiction.80 These institutional recommendations inevitably
involve not only caseload considerations, but also policy judgments
about competing groups that seek access to and the protection of the
federal courts.81 Resnik argues that the norms advocated by the Judi-
cial Conference become background assumptions that can shape the
adjudication of cases, determining the rights of the groups in ques-
ference Committees that propose policies to the governing board. Resnik, Programmatic Judici-
ary, supra note 64, at 285.
77. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
78. Rehnquist is not known as a supporter of women’s issues. Before joining the Court, he
opposed the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution and suggested that the
women’s movement includes “a virtually fanatical desire to obscure not only legal differentia-
tion between men and women, but insofar as possible, physical distinctions between the sexes.”
DONALD E. BOLES, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUDICIAL ACTIVIST: THE EARLY YEARS 6–7
(1987) (quoting Rehnquist).
79. Justice Thomas’s opinion in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 889, 936–39 (Thomas, J.,
concurring), suggests that he is receptive to a robust interpretation of the Second Amendment
that would limit the government’s authority to regulate firearms. See also Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 611 (1994) (Thomas, J.) (rejecting the government’s assertion that hand-
guns should be likened to hand grenades, and observing that “despite their potential for harm,
guns generally can be owned in perfect innocence”).
80. Resnik, Programmatic Judiciary, supra note 64, at 278–82.
81. Id. at 287–88.
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tion.82 Positive political theory reinforces Resnik’s observations about
the motives of the Judicial Conference and lends weight to her call for
restricting the judiciary’s role in lobbying regarding the scope of fed-
eral jurisdiction.
Separation of powers concerns, on the other hand, support self-
interested judicial rulings (and perhaps even judicial lobbying), par-
ticularly when the political branches adopt policies that can seriously
damage the courts and the public interest. William Stuntz argues
powerfully that the institutional roles of both prosecutors and legisla-
tors drive them to continually expand the criminal law, increasing the
number and breadth of offenses as well as the penalties.83 Action is
more politically popular than inaction, and at the federal level most
anticrime legislation creates new federal offenses or provides new
federal resources to prosecute federal offenses. This institutional de-
sign, Stuntz suggests, leaves the courts with relatively little ability to
check the one-way ratchet wielded by the other branches.84 Other re-
search suggests that the media’s focus on crime also creates strong
public and political pressures in favor of ever-expanding criminal li-
ability.85
If these accounts of the political economy of criminal law are cor-
rect, they may argue for allowing the courts some leeway to enter the
political arena. They certainly provide a reason to allow courts to
consider institutional self-interest as a factor in their constitutional
analysis. Indeed, the fundamental insight of positive political theory—
that each branch acts in ways consistent with its institutional self-
interest—is a fundamental tenet of the theory of separation of powers
as espoused by the Founders. As Federalist No. 51 explains, the pur-
pose of the division of powers among the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches is for the branches to “be the means of keeping each
82. Id. at 288–89; cf. generally Robel, supra note 43 (identifying the federal judiciary’s insti-
tutional interests and suggesting that it should not lobby Congress about jurisdictional provi-
sions).
83. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. ___
(forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 528–39, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
84. Id. (manuscript at 529).
85. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got To Do With It: The Political, Social, Psycho-
logical and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 47–51 (1997) (describing research identifying direct and indirect means
by which crime and violence in the media may influence public opinion); Sara Sun Beale, Eco-
nomic Pressures and Internal Structure Shape the U.S. Media’s Treatment of Crime: Do They
Also Shape U.S. Criminal Justice Policy? 1 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that media coverage has had a significant impact on public
opinion and criminal justice policy).
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other in their proper places.”86 The constitutional structure was
premised upon the idea that each branch would be self-interested:
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”87 Thus it is entirely
proper for the judiciary, which bears the burden of Congress’s exten-
sion of federal jurisdiction to gun cases, to bring these values into play
in its interpretation of the Commerce Clause, providing some coun-
terweight to the political branches, which inevitably will press, over
time, for enlarged criminal jurisdiction.
B. Executive Initiatives
The same expansive pressures also operate at the administrative
level under the existing federal gun statutes. In conjunction with local
authorities, the United States attorney in Richmond, Virginia, devel-
oped a program called Project Exile.88 Beginning in early 1997, Proj-
ect Exile targeted gun violence in Richmond by funneling all gun ar-
rests made by state and local authorities into federal court, where, if
at all possible, defendants were prosecuted under federal firearms
statutes.89 This was, of course, a radical departure from the ordinary
practice, in which street crime is the general province of state and lo-
cal police and prosecutors. As a result of Exile, gun homicides
dropped substantially in Richmond, and Exile became one of the
most highly publicized federal anticrime initiatives of the Clinton
era.90
Project Exile gun prosecutions are now being handled by prose-
cutors detailed from state and local offices.91 Thus, although the
United States attorney initially believed that the project (which has
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
87. Id. at 322.
88. Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 370 (2001).
89. Id. at 370. As Richman explains, federal authorities relied principally upon federal stat-
utes that criminalize the possession of a firearm by anyone previously convicted of a felony or
crime of domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000), and the use of a firearm in connection
with drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Richman, supra note 88, at 370 & nn.4–5.
90. Richman, supra note 88, at 370 (quoting President Clinton’s claim that the number of
gun murders declined by forty-one percent). Richman analyzes the political support for Project
Exile, which has been strongest among Republicans, conservatives, and supporters of the Na-
tional Rifle Association, and contrasts Exile with competing programs that received greater
support from Democrats and those who favor more aggressive gun control measures. See id. at
371, 406–07 (noting that many conservatives rallied around Project Exile while some Democrats
championed an “activist regulatory program”).
91. See id. at 380 (noting that two years after the initiation of Project Exile it required more
limited personnel resources because cases were staffed in part by prosecutors “detailed from
state and local offices”).
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generated more than 400 cases) would be a substantial burden on her
office,92 a later review reported that the personnel resources required
were “relatively limited” because state prosecutors had been desig-
nated to handle these federal cases.93 The practice of cross-designating
state prosecutors to bring federal prosecutions is now well estab-
lished, and it is one of the means that can be used to cope with an ex-
panded caseload of gun-related crimes. Indeed, Senator D’Amato ar-
gued that state prosecutors could be designated to bring the resulting
federal prosecutions if his amendment making all gun crimes federal
offenses were enacted.94
Project Exile demonstrates that efforts to expand federal juris-
diction over gun offenses can alter what federal jurisdiction means in
practice. In gun cases, federal jurisdiction may routinely mean that a
state rather than a federal prosecutor will exercise charging and bar-
gaining discretion, and will represent the United States in court.
Statutory authority clearly allows individuals to act as federal prose-
cutors in particular cases.95 But programs like Project Exile may trans-
form case-by-case cross-designation into a semipermanent, wholesale
incorporation of a group of junior varsity federal prosecutors. These
prosecutors will not undergo the same selection process as “real” fed-
eral prosecutors,96 and they will not have the same training.97 More-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 140 CONG. REC. S6093 (1994) (statement of Sen. D’Amato).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) provides that:
[A]ny attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law, may, when
specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any kind of legal proceeding,
civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings and proceedings before committing
magistrates, which United States attorneys are authorized by law to conduct, whether
or not he is a resident of the district in which the proceeding is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (1994). Subsection (b) provides that “[e]ach attorney specially retained under
authority of the Department of Justice shall be commissioned as special assistant to the Attor-
ney General or special attorney.” Id. § 515(b).
96. For a variety of reasons, the federal hiring process is generally more selective than the
state process. Two important factors are compensation and workload. Federal pay scales gener-
ally exceed those for state prosecutors, and federal prosecutors generally are responsible for a
smaller number of cases. Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining
Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1127–28 (2001)
(“The imperative to move an omnipresent backlog of cases through the system, so common in
state prosecutors’ offices, is rarely a consideration among United States Attorney’s Offices.”)
(footnotes omitted).
97. Federal prosecutors generally have more extensive opportunities for training than their
state counterparts. The Department of Justice’s Executive Office for United States Attorneys
operates the National Advocacy Center (NAC) to train 10,000 federal and state prosecutors
annually. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NAC Facts, USDOJ.gov, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
ole/nacfacts.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating that
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over, virtually all state prosecutors work in offices headed by an
elected district attorney, and state prosecutors’ offices are typically
more politicized than their federal counterparts.98 The federal system
is quite decentralized, with most prosecutorial decisions controlled by
the United States attorney in each federal judicial district, but all fed-
eral prosecutors receive a degree of centralized control, training, and
oversight from the Department of Justice, and they benefit from cen-
tralized legal and policy resources.99 The present federal system keeps
politics in check and strikes a careful balance between uniformity and
diversity. The centralizing effects of the authority of the attorney gen-
eral and the Department of Justice are balanced by the authority con-
ferred on the presidentially appointed United States attorneys who
are responsible for federal law enforcement in their judicial dis-
the facility was built to “train federal, state, and local prosecutors” and that “more than 10,000
[were] expected to train annually”). Although courses for state prosecutors are presented at
NAC by the National District Attorneys Association, a review of the curriculum indicates that
the bulk of the courses are aimed at federal attorneys and members of their staffs. See U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, OLE Course Schedule, USDOJ.gov, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ole/
calendar.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (listing the courses
taught at NAC during fiscal year 2002). Given the relative numbers of federal and state prosecu-
tors, the average federal prosecutor is far more likely to attend courses at NAC than the aver-
age state prosecutor.
98. See Stuntz, supra note 83 (manuscript at 533 n.117) (citing a government report con-
cluding that more than ninety-five percent of local district attorneys are elected).
In contrast, federal prosecutors report to supervisors who are appointed, rather than
elected. Most federal prosecutions are conducted by assistant United States attorneys, who are
appointed by and report to the United States attorney for the district in question. See JAMES
EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND
LEGAL SYSTEMS 12 (1978) (noting that in practice United States attorneys select their own as-
sistants, even though the attorney general has the formal authority to hire and remove assis-
tants). Some federal prosecutions (e.g., tax cases) are conducted by attorneys from a division of
the Department of Justice. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL ¶ 6-4.200, USDOJ.gov, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/
title6/4mtax.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating that
with few exceptions, the “Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, has responsibility for all
criminal proceedings arising under the internal revenue laws”); id. ¶ 6-2.000 (noting the re-
quirement of Tax Division approval for the initiation of grand jury proceedings, indictments,
etc.). Each such division is headed by an assistant attorney general who is a presidential ap-
pointee subject to Senate confirmation. See 28 U.S.C. § 506 (1994) (providing that the president
may appoint assistant attorneys general with the advice and consent of the Senate). Ultimately
all federal prosecutors are subject to the supervision of the attorney general, see EISENSTEIN,
supra, at 12 (noting that “[t]he ability of the Attorney General to hire and fire his field office
supervisors rests on his influence with the President and [on] his willingness to exert it”), who is
also nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (providing that
the president shall appoint the attorney general with the advice and consent of the Senate).
99. For example, the United States Attorneys’ Manual and related publications provide
well-researched guidance on substantive and procedural law.
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tricts.100 When cross-designated state prosecutors are given responsi-
bility for a part of the federal criminal docket, do they exercise their
authority in the same fashion as “real” federal prosecutors? How
does this affect the balance between uniformity and diversity? Does it
inject a greater political emphasis in prosecutorial decisions? Given
the enormous discretion wielded by federal prosecutors (a point dis-
cussed in greater detail below),101 a good deal rides on the decision to
consistently use such hybrid federal-state prosecutors.
Project Exile has had a different effect on the courts. Prosecuto-
rial discretion and the option of cross-designating state prosecutors
give the Justice Department and federal prosecutors the means to
deal with legislative efforts to expand federal jurisdiction to reach
gun-related crime.102 If federal prosecutors lack sufficient resources to
prosecute these cases, they may choose not to bring the prosecutions
or may cross-designate state prosecutors to present the cases in fed-
eral court. In contrast to prosecutors, the federal courts have no ca-
pacity to cross-designate state judges, and they have no discretion to
dismiss criminal prosecutions that exceed their resources.103 Thus the
federal courts are more likely than federal prosecutors to feel the
pinch of legislation extending federal criminal jurisdiction and may
have a greater stake in reading such statutes narrowly or construing
the Commerce Clause in a narrow fashion.104 It is unsurprising that
100. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 98, at 54–125 (discussing the dynamic balance of power
among the United States attorneys, the attorney general, and the Department of Justice); see
also Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 789–810 (1999) (discussing how Congress constrains the dis-
cretion of federal prosecutors).
101. See infra Part II.B (describing prosecutors’ decisions not to charge defendants with
§ 924(c) violations).
102. Moreover, at least in the case of proposals to expand Project Exile, specific funds may
be earmarked for additional federal prosecutors. See Richman, supra note 88, at 384–85, 393,
395 (describing various proposals that would provide funding for additional federal prosecutors
for firearms cases).
103. Cf. United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953, 954–55 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
systematic movement of state criminal cases to federal court may be a source of concern to fed-
eral courts, but concluding that, in light of the “executive’s [discretionary power] to initiate
criminal proceedings,” the federal courts have no authority to dismiss cases even in the absence
of any discernible federal interests or ties).
104. It should be noted, however, that eventually the executive branch bears the cost of the
incarceration of all federal offenders, and this expense has been growing very rapidly. See Sara
Sun Beale, Reporter’s Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use When Considering the
Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1289–92 (1995) (describing the growth
in the federal prison population and the budget for the Bureau of Prisons, and noting that fed-
eral expenditures for law enforcement have grown more rapidly than state expenditures). In-
deed, federalization of crimes traditionally prosecuted by the states “[can be viewed] as a form
of in-kind fiscal relief for state and local government, which do not have to pay for the investiga-
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the chief judge of the United States District Court in Richmond has
complained that Project Exile has turned the federal district court
into a “a minor-grade police court.”105 This objection underlines the
point made in the previous Section about the federal courts’ self-
interested behavior.
Pressure also may be building on another traditional boundary,
the boundary between legislative and executive authority in the deci-
sion to bring federal criminal prosecutions. Project Exile demon-
strates that existing federal firearms provisions are already broad
enough, if used aggressively, to flood the federal courts with cases
that traditionally have been heard in state courts. At present, each
United States attorney’s office decides how many gun cases to bring.
Congress traditionally has accorded federal prosecutors virtually un-
regulated discretion to determine whether and when to bring prose-
cutions under the existing federal criminal statutes.106 Prosecutors use
their discretion to tailor caseloads to resources, accommodate local
circumstances, set priorities, and take account of the equities and evi-
dentiary strengths of individual cases. Although prosecutors exercise
much of their discretion in a decentralized fashion, the attorney gen-
eral establishes some priorities at a national level. At various points in
time Attorneys General have made white collar and organized crime
national priorities,107 and during the early 1990s, Attorney General
Richard Thornburg announced Operation Triggerlock, an effort to
use federal laws to prosecute the most serious violent offenders.108 Al-
though these prosecutorial priorities have been set by the attorney
tive, prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional resources that are now devoted to these cases.” Id.
at 1291. This fiscal relief occurs, on a deferred basis, when the state conducts the investigation
and provides the prosecutor, but the federal government provides the judicial and correctional
resources.
105. John S. Baker, State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMPLE
L. REV. 673, 687 (1999) (quoting a letter from the chief judge to Chief Justice Rehnquist); see
also United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310–12 (E.D. Va. 1999) (criticizing Project Exile
for subjecting African-American defendants to trial before juries with a low percentage of Afri-
can Americans and also for violating principles of federalism). Jones is discussed in Richman,
supra note 88, at 382–83, 400 n.205.
106. For a discussion of the factors that traditionally govern the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in the federal system, see NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 317–31, 642–53 (3d ed. 2000), and Richman, supra
note 100, at 789–805.
107. For a brief discussion of national priorities, see ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 106, at
104–12.
108. See Text of Triggerlock Implementation Memo, DOJ ALERT, vol. 1, No. 1, at 17 (July
1991) (stating that the objective of Project Triggerlock was to deter “criminals from possessing
firearms”).
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general, the United States attorneys, and the heads of other units
within the Department of Justice, those priorities were subject to a
continuing dialogue with Congress as it pursued its oversight respon-
sibilities and considered the Department’s appropriations.
Since Project Exile, however, Congress has proposed various na-
tionwide mandates based on the Exile model.109 It would be a highly
significant change if Congress were to mandate a national program
requiring prosecutors to bring gun cases in the federal courts, instead
of simply providing federal prosecutors with the tools to bring such
cases in their discretion. Some of the post-Exile legislative activity
takes a step in that direction. For example, the Criminal Use of Fire-
arms by Felons (CUFF) Program, which the Senate passed in 1999
with the support of Republicans (including then-Senator John Ash-
croft) provided that in twenty-five high-crime jurisdictions the attor-
ney general and the secretary of the treasury were to provide for the
establishment of Exile-style agreements, in which state and local law
enforcement officials would refer firearms prosecutions to the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the United States attorney.110
CUFF also required that the United States attorney in each district
designate not less than one assistant to prosecute these cases, and
most importantly, that each person referred to the United States At-
torney’s Office under these programs be charged with a violation of
the most serious federal firearms offense committed.111
The recent experience with Project Exile demonstrates that the
efforts to impose harsh federal penalties on gun criminals may have a
major effect on federal prosecutorial practices by weakening the tra-
ditional assumption that federal prosecutors will prosecute federal
crimes, and by giving Congress an incentive to regulate prosecutorial
practices more closely.
II.  THE BOUNDARY DEFINING GUN OFFENSES—PRESSURE AT THE
MARGINS, EVASION IN SOME CORE CASES
Another boundary, the line defining the elements of the offenses
in question, also has been affected by the pressure to increase the
punishments for gun crimes. The principal federal firearms enhance-
ment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which has become the most fre-
109. Richman, supra note 88, at 386–90 (detailing legislators’ reactions to Exile and the re-
sulting proposals).
110. S. 254, 106th Cong. § 803 (1999).
111. Richman, supra note 88, at 387–88 & nn. 132–35.
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quently prosecuted federal firearms statute, presents the clearest evi-
dence of this trend.112 In contrast to the pressure on the federal-state
boundary, which originates with Congress, the pressure on an of-
fense’s definition comes primarily from prosecutors (though the
courts and Congress play roles in response). Congress sets a boundary
when it defines the elements of a federal offense. Federal prosecutors
then select cases that arguably fall within the statutory language and
prosecute them under the statute in question. Inevitably, questions
arise about the breadth of particular statutory terms, and individual
prosecutors (and the Department of Justice) have to determine how
aggressively to interpret these terms. In this Part, I show that federal
prosecutors have argued in favor of very expansive—and in some
cases quite extreme—interpretations of the elements of § 924(c), and
that this prosecutorial behavior is a response to the opportunity to
impose higher penalties in additional cases that do not implicate the
core concerns of § 924(c).
The volume of litigation concerning the definition of § 924(c) has
been extraordinary. The Supreme Court has decided eight cases in-
volving different facets of the construction of § 924(c) since its pas-
sage in 1968,113 and many other issues have been litigated extensively
in the lower courts. This unusual volume of litigation results, at least
in part, from especially aggressive efforts by federal prosecutors to
impose harsher penalties in cases at—or beyond—the outer limits of
112. Patrick Walker & Pragati Patrick, Trends in Firearms Cases from Fiscal Year 1989
Through 1998, and the Workload Implications for the U.S. District Courts, USCOURTS.gov, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/firearms/firearms00.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (writing on behalf of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and
noting that § 924(c) was the most frequently prosecuted firearms offense in 1998).
113. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 121 (2000) (concluding that the subsection that
imposes a higher penalty on the use of a “machinegun” than on other firearms states an element
of a separate aggravated crime under § 924(c)); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126–
27 (1998) (construing the term “carry” under § 924(c) to include firearms conveyed in a vehicle);
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6–11 (1997) (construing “any other term of imprison-
ment” to require sentences under § 924(c) to be served consecutively to state as well as federal
sentences); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995) (construing “uses” to require active
employment); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993) (construing the term “uses” to
include the situation in which a defendant trades a firearm for drugs); Deal v. United States, 508
U.S. 129, 130–31 (1993) (construing the phrase “second or subsequent conviction” to mean “‘an
additional finding of guilt rendered at any time’”); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 399–401
(1980) (holding that a sentence for a § 924(c) violation may not be imposed in a prosecution for
assault under 18 U.S.C. § 111, which provides for an enhanced sentence when a defendant
“uses” a deadly weapon); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 16 (1978) (holding that a sen-
tence for a § 924(c) violation may not be imposed in a prosecution for bank robbery under 18
U.S.C. § 2113, which provides for an enhanced sentence when robbery is committed “by use of a
dangerous weapon or device”).
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the statute, as defined by the statutory terms enacted by Congress.
The higher penalties that were intended to deter would-be criminals
have given prosecutors a strong incentive to press the boundaries of
the statute outward to capture more cases.
This Part describes the litigation in which the government has
pressed to expand the coverage of § 924(c), and then explores two
other trends that seem on their face to conflict with the theory that
the government is pressing the outward boundaries defining this of-
fense. These seemingly conflicting trends reflect an underutilization
of the statute, namely the frequent discretionary dismissal of charges,
and the refusal of prosecutors to charge under § 924(c) (despite its
mandatory terms) in a significant proportion of the cases that clearly
fall within its ambit. The end result of the effort to impose harsh fed-
eral penalties on gun crimes has been the opposite of that intended.
Part I described how the effort to expand federal jurisdiction—
and thus harsh federal penalties—to more gun cases resulted in deci-
sions announcing a curtailment of legislative authority under the
Commerce Clause. This Part explains how a similar unintended
backlash has undermined the legislative goal. Although the class of
cases in which the penalties may be imposed has been expanded by
prosecutorial efforts to convince the courts to give the statute an un-
usually broad reading, Congress’s efforts to ratchet up the penalties
and make them mandatory has created a situation in which it appears
that the penalties are now imposed in only a minority of the cases to
which they apply.
A. Pressing the Definitional Limits of the Elements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)
Federal and state firearms enhancement statutes impose addi-
tional penalties on offenders who employ firearms in the commission
of certain offenses. These enhancement statutes reflect “the com-
mon-sense view of many policymakers—and much of the public—that
[longer sentences] will necessarily reduce gun crime, either through
deterrence of new offenses or incapacitation of dangerous offend-
ers.”114
114. Hofer, supra note 1, at 45. For a recent statement on the floor of Congress expressing
these assumptions, see 144 CONG. REC. S12670 (1998) (statement of Sen. DeWine) (noting that
“the purpose of this ‘use or carry’ provision is twofold: to punish criminals who use guns, and to
be a deterrent to would-be criminals not to use a gun”).
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In seeking these goals, Congress repeatedly has ratcheted up the
penalties under § 924(c).115 As originally enacted in 1968, § 924(c) was
punishable by sentence of one to ten years in addition to the penalty
for the underlying offense.116 In 1984, the statute was amended to re-
quire a minimum sentence of five years, to be served consecutively to
the underlying offense if a defendant used or carried a firearm in a
crime of violence.117 Later amendments added drug trafficking to the
predicate offenses and increased the penalties.118 A mandatory con-
secutive term of thirty years was provided for using or carrying more
dangerous firearms (such as machine guns and assault weapons), and
a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years to life was provided for of-
fenders with prior convictions.119 Congress in 1998 increased the pen-
alties for “brandishing” or “discharging” a firearm in the course of a
predicate felony and for repeat offenders and those who use espe-
cially dangerous firearms.120
115. For a more detailed discussion of the legislative history of § 924(c), see Kristin Whiting,
The Aftermath of Bailey v. United States: Should Possession Replace Carry and Use Under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)?, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 679, 682–91 (1997). See also David T. Hardy, The Firearms
Owners’ Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 589–604
(1987) (reviewing the legislative history of firearms provisions through 1986).
116. Although § 924(c) was enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 902, 82 Stat. 197, 233, the pertinent provisions were added
later that year in an amendment included in the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618,
§ 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1223–24.
117. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2028, 2138.
118. See Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a), 100 Stat. 449, 457
(1986) (adding drug trafficking to predicate offenses under § 924(c)).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2000) (stating that anyone committing a crime while car-
rying a machine gun will be sentenced to an additional thirty years); id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (in-
creasing the additional sentence for a second or subsequent offense to twenty-five years).
120. Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1, 112 Stat. 3469, 3469–70. Section
924(c)(1) now provides:
(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by
this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in rela-
tion to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by
the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in fur-
therance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
less than 10 years.
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection—
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Three aspects of § 924(c) are significant: the penalties are harsh,
they are mandatory upon conviction, and they must be served con-
secutively to all other sentences. For a first offense under § 924(c)(1),
the mandatory minimum sentence for “use” of a firearm ranges from
five to thirty years (depending upon the type of firearm involved) if
the firearm is neither brandished nor discharged.121 The penalties for a
“second or subsequent conviction” are even more severe: a manda-
tory minimum consecutive term of twenty-five years of imprisonment,
regardless of the type of firearm involved.122 These mandatory penal-
ties are designed to be severe, and they now exceed the penalties im-
posed for many of the most serious federal and state offenses. For ex-
ample, the median sentence for rape or robbery in state courts is five
years, and the median state sentence for aggravated assault is twenty-
three months.123 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the aver-
age base offense levels for bank robbery, kidnapping, and assault with
intent to kill are all less than five years, the lowest sentence possible
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault
weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 10 years; or
(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm si-
lencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment of not less than 30 years.
(C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person
shall—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years; and
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is
equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be sentenced to imprison-
ment for life.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law—
(i) a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of
this subsection; and
(ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall
run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person,
including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (B). The minimum penalty increases to seven years if the
weapon is brandished, and to ten years if the weapon is discharged. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (iii).
122. Id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).
123. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 458 tbl.5.44 (2000), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/
pdf/section5.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (reporting data from 1996).
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under § 924(c).124 Although the Sentencing Guidelines themselves
provide for enhancements when a firearm is involved in the commis-
sion of an offense, sentences are substantially less under the Guide-
lines enhancements than under § 924(c).125 Furthermore, because sen-
tences under § 924(c)(1) are mandatory and consecutive to all other
sentences, a defendant will be imprisoned significantly longer if he is
charged and convicted under the statute.
Thus, § 924(c) now operates as a kind of super-enhancement
statute. Although Congress sought to alter the behavior of would-be
criminals, the provision’s effects on the behavior of the prosecution
and defense are more interesting.
In civil litigation, a damage remedy that is significantly greater
than remedies for similar causes of action does alter litigants’ behav-
ior. The civil provision of RICO—which provides for treble damages
plus attorneys fees126—presents a useful comparison. Many garden-
variety civil causes of action also can support civil RICO claims,127 and
124. Under the Guidelines, the base offense sentences for the following offenses are:
robbery 33–41 months;
kidnapping 51–63 months;
assault with intent to kill 41–51 months (except assault with intent to commit first
degree murder); and
voluntary manslaughter 57–71 months.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2A1.3, 2A2.1, 2A4.1, 2B3.1 (2001) (using the table
in chapter 5.A of the Guidelines to convert offense levels to the corresponding length of sen-
tence that can be imposed). These offense levels are adjusted upwards if a firearm is displayed,
brandished, discharged, or otherwise used. See supra notes 114–20 and accompanying text; cf.
144 CONG. REC. H10330 (1998) (statement of Rep. Scott) (opposing the 1998 increase in penal-
ties in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on the ground that the mandatory ten-year minimum sentence for a
defendant who possessed both crack and a handgun would be more than the penalty for the
more serious offenses of rape, aggravated assault, or kidnapping).
125. One study by a researcher from the Sentencing Commission finds that the sentence im-
posed by § 924(c) (as amended in 1998) exceeds the current average sentence under the Guide-
lines by thirty-one to ninety months for each representative group of offenses. Hofer, supra note
1, at 67 & tbl.2. The largest difference is for aggravated assault in which a firearm was dis-
charged, where the average sentence under the Guidelines in fiscal year 1998 was sixty-nine
months, and the sentence under § 924(c) as amended would be 159 months. Id. Another study
by researchers from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts also finds that the average en-
hancement under the statute between 1992 and 1998 far exceeded the average imposed under
the Guidelines. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Special Report, Federal Fire-
arm Offenders, 1992–98, with Preliminary Data for 1999, at 9 tbl.8 (2000), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ffo98.htm [hereinafter Bureau of Justice Statistics] (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (noting that the average firearm enhancement from 1992 to 1998 varied
from 81 to 109.7 months under the statute and from 12.7 to 17.4 months under the Guidelines).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
127. See Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43
VAND. L. REV. 769, 793–94 (1990) (reporting that few civil RICO lawsuits concern organized
crime and also noting that allegations of business or securities fraud account for the “vast bulk”
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professional responsibility requires plaintiffs’ counsel to state civil
RICO allegations where they can be made in good faith.128 Indeed,
one authority on RICO suggests that “it is virtually malpractice not to
add a RICO cause of action to a complaint” wherever technically
possible.129 Once the private bar understood the potential of civil
RICO, plaintiffs’ lawyers exploited RICO in a wide variety of cases
ranging far afield from the organized crime cases Congress contem-
plated.130 Plaintiffs’ counsel clearly pushed the envelope on various
elements of this cause of action in an attempt to obtain triple recov-
eries plus litigation costs. Since the elements of criminal and civil
RICO are the same, it is not surprising that most of the Supreme
Court decisions construing the elements of RICO have come in civil
cases, as private civil plaintiffs urged the federal courts to accept ex-
tremely broad interpretations of the elements of a RICO cause of ac-
tion.131
The availability of super-enhanced sentences under § 924(c) ap-
pears to have had a similar effect in the federal criminal context. Fed-
eral prosecutors pushed the envelope on each of the various terms of
the statute: “uses,” “carries,” “crime of violence,” and “second or
of civil RICO suits). Note, however, that in 1995 RICO was amended to restrict its application
in cases falling under the federal securities laws. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
128. Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from Civil
RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 36–37 (1996).
129. Lynch, supra note 127, at 794.
130. See id. at 794–95 (stating that “the sprawling shapelessness of RICO create[d] the
problem [and made] it relatively easy for plaintiffs to formulate a RICO cause of action”); see
also ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 106, at 489 (noting that “[t]he current RICO statute now
lists so many offenses as ‘racketeering activity’ that there is hardly an important federal crime
that is not listed”). In the lower courts, RICO claims have been asserted in a remarkably broad
range of complaints, involving, for example, the operation of a business during a bankruptcy
proceeding, the conduct of a utility in rate proceedings, a trustee’s conduct of estate, the proce-
dures for obtaining a signature on a brokerage agreement, a dispute concerning the education
provided by a beauty college, patent infringement and unfair competition, fees for architectural
services, and a union’s strike-related activities. NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 536–37 (2d ed. 1993).
131. See Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256–62 (1994) (construing
the term “enterprise”); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (construing the phrase
“to conduct or participate” in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racket-
eering activity); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989) (construing the
phrase “pattern of racketeering activity”). In addition, the Supreme Court also has rendered a
number of decisions on the scope and applicability of the civil RICO cause of action. See, e.g.,
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–70 (1992) (holding that common law
proximate cause rules are applicable to RICO cases); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 456–58
(1990) (recognizing concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over civil RICO claims); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985) (holding that neither a prior criminal con-
viction nor separate racketeering injury is a prerequisite to civil liability).
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subsequent conviction.” For example, until its amendment in 1998,
§ 924(c)(1) proscribed the “use”—but not the mere possession—of a
weapon during a crime of violence or drug-trafficking offense. Fed-
eral prosecutors, seeking to extend the reach of the statute far beyond
the obvious cases involving defendants who brandished or discharged
a weapon, advocated an extremely broad interpretation of the term
“use.” Two of the most expansive theories advocated by the govern-
ment were the gun fortress theory, which applied § 924(c) to the pos-
session of guns in a house where drugs were also present, and the
guns could be used to protect drugs,132 and the theory that a firearm
was “used” when its possession “emboldened” a defendant commit-
ting a crime. Under these theories, enhanced penalties applied when a
defendant possessed but made no active use of a firearm. In perhaps
the most extreme case under the drug fortress theory, prosecutors
charged that a paraplegic who was confined to a wheelchair “used” a
firearm found hidden in the crawl space beneath his house.133 Many
lower courts accepted such broad interpretations (and, in fact, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction of the paraplegic).134 Ultimately
this line of cases was reversed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bailey v. United States,135 which held that under § 924(c) the term
“use” reaches only the “active employment” of a firearm, not merely
a potential for use.136
Because federal prosecutors had extended the statute so far be-
yond cases of “active employment,” the Bailey decision substantially
reduced the number of new prosecutions brought under § 924(c). It
also created a wave of litigation in the lower courts, as federal prison-
ers challenged sentences imposed under broader interpretations of
the statute. According to two major studies, limiting § 924(c) to the
active use of a firearm excluded thousands of cases from the reach of
its super-enhanced penalties. In a recent special report, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics found that in the first month following the Bailey de-
cision, fifty percent fewer defendants were prosecuted under § 924(c)
132. For a discussion of the gun fortress theory, see 1 WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, supra note
15, § 11.7(A), at 467; Angela LaBuda Collins, Note, The Latest Amendment to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c): Congressional Reaction to the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Statute, 48 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1319, 1350 (1999).
133. United States v. Torres-Medina, 935 F.2d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing the
jury’s verdict). For cases adopting the emboldening theory of possession, see Collins, supra note
132, at 1351 & n.202.
134. Torres-Medina, 935 F.2d at 1048.
135. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
136. Id. at 143.
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than in the last month prior to that decision, and it estimated that in
the thirty-three months following Bailey, 2500 fewer defendants were
charged with violating § 924(c).137 Paul Hofer, a Senior Research As-
sociate at the Sentencing Commission, concludes that the Supreme
Court’s decision affected even more cases; he estimates that “between
1500 and 2250 cases in a typical year were disqualified for Section
924(c) by the Bailey decision.”138 Because the Supreme Court gave
Bailey retroactive application, holding that it could be raised by fed-
eral inmates on collateral review,139 Bailey also gave rise to challenges
by those previously convicted of passive forms of “use.” More than
10,000 persons were serving sentences under § 924(c) at the time of
the Bailey decision.140 Although there are no reliable figures on how
many of those convictions have been reversed under Bailey,141 the de-
cision certainly touched off a wave of litigation in the lower federal
courts.142
Federal prosecutors also advanced other broad interpretations of
§ 924(c). They argued that a firearm was “used” within the meaning
of § 924(c) when it was traded for drugs,143 and that a firearm was
“carried” within the meaning of the statute when it was conveyed in a
vehicle, even if locked in a trunk or glove compartment and thus not
137. Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 125, at 3.
138. Hofer, supra note 1, at 60–61 (emphasis added). It appears that Hofer’s estimates in-
clude all cases that could have been charged under § 924(c); but note that federal prosecutors do
not employ § 924(c) in many of the cases where the facts would support such a charge. See infra
Part II.B.
139. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616 (1998).
140. Frank J. Murray, Justices Overturn Convictions Based on New Gun Use Ruling, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, at A4.
141. Immediately after the ruling, a spokesman for the Justice Department estimated that
the opinion would affect only “a few hundred cases.” Id. That estimate seems low when it is
compared to the percentage of new prosecutions affected by the ruling. On the other hand, most
convictions are the result of a guilty plea, and a variety of procedural hurdles confront defen-
dants who seek to overturn their convictions in collateral proceedings. See, e.g., Bousley, 523
U.S. at 623 (holding that a defendant who seeks to raise Bailey error on collateral attack after a
guilty plea must establish “actual innocence” plus the absence of a knowing and intelligent
plea); Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 barred relief for the defendant despite the government’s
stipulation that his conduct was insufficient to constitute “use” of a firearm under Bailey).
142. Bailey has been cited in more than 1699 cases in the lower federal courts, and Bousley
(which held that Bailey can be applied retroactively) has been cited in approximately 598 cases.
But those counts certainly include prosecutions brought after Bailey, as well as cases raising
other issues. See Westlaw database search, KeyCite citing references to Bailey, from Dec. 6,
1995 to Feb. 15, 2002; Westlaw database search, KeyCite citing references to Bousley, from May
18, 1998, to Feb. 15, 2002.
143. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 227–41 (1993).
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readily accessible.144 The Supreme Court accepted these arguments,
broadening the reach of § 924(c) significantly. On the other hand, the
Court rejected the government’s argument that mandatory penalties
under § 924(c) could be added to offense-specific firearm enhance-
ments under the bank robbery and assault statutes.145
In other cases, prosecutors sought interpretations of the statute
that would increase the sentences available in cases falling clearly
within § 924(c). Section 924(c)(1)(C) imposes a mandatory minimum
consecutive twenty-year term of imprisonment for any “second or
subsequent offense.” This clearly applies where a defendant who al-
ready has been convicted and served a sentence for a violation of
§ 924(c) commits a second offense after his release, but prosecutors
sought to apply it to charges brought in a single indictment. In some
cases, these charges were based upon separate incidents that occurred
at different places and times. For example, in a case that reached the
Supreme Court, the defendant committed six bank robberies, using a
gun on each occasion, and was convicted and sentenced at a single
proceeding to 105 years (including five years on the first § 924(c)
count and twenty years on each of the other five “subsequent” counts
under § 924(c)).146 In other instances, federal prosecutors argued that
multiple violations—each requiring a mandatory consecutive term of
at least twenty years—could be based upon the same predicate of-
fense.147 In one case, the government charged the defendant with two
predicate offenses, a cocaine conspiracy and managing a continuing
criminal enterprise. Seven different guns were found at various loca-
tions, two of which had been discharged.148 How many § 924(c) counts
did the government charge? Two, because two weapons were dis-
charged? Seven, because the defendant possessed seven weapons?
144. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–39 (1998).
145. See Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 399–400 (1980) (holding that a sentence for a
§ 924(c) violation may not be imposed in a prosecution for assault on a federal officer under 18
U.S.C. § 111, which provides for an enhanced sentence when a defendant “uses” a deadly
weapon); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 16 (1978) (holding that a sentence for a § 924(c)
violation may not be imposed in a prosecution for bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113, which
provides for an enhanced sentence when robbery is committed “by use of a dangerous weapon
or device”). These decisions were overridden by legislation enacted in 1984. See infra note 156.
146. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 130–31 (1993).
147. For cases accepting the government’s arguments, see, for example, United States v.
Camps, 32 F.3d 102, 107 (4th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Lucas, 932 F.3d 1210, 1222–23 (8th
Cir. 1991). For a discussion of the resolution of this issue in other circuits, see United States v.
Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323, 1328–1331 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
148. United States v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 677 (2d Cir. 1993) (reversing twelve of the four-
teen convictions).
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No, fourteen, because he was charged with two offenses, and each of
the seven weapons were charged separately in connection with each
of the two offenses.149 (And of course the two charges of conspiracy
and continuing criminal enterprise also overlap substantially, but that
is another story.) In Deal v. United States150 a majority of the Supreme
Court accepted the government’s construction of the statute.151
This pattern suggests that federal prosecutors have responded to
the incentive provided by the enhanced penalties provided under
§ 924(c), both by making § 924(c) the most frequently prosecuted
federal firearms offense and by aggressively seeking to broaden its
reach through expansive interpretations of its terms. Although previ-
ous studies have found that prosecutors are most strongly motivated
by the likelihood of conviction,152 they also may respond to the likely
penalty. This incentive may work not only at the level of individual
prosecutors, but also at the level of departmental allocation of re-
sources. As noted by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, a
surge in the number of prosecutions between 1989 and 1991 appears
to have been the result of the passage of legislation in 1988 increasing
the penalties under that provision.153 Following passage, both the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Department of Jus-
tice added significant personnel to handle these cases, and the num-
ber of prosecutions increased substantially.154 On the other hand,
political agendas also drive prosecutorial policy. In 1991, the Depart-
ment of Justice initiated Operation Triggerlock,155 which led to a ma-
jor increase in the number of firearms investigations and prosecu-
tions, and Triggerlock foreshadowed current initiatives, such as
Project Exile.
Once federal prosecutors paved the way with expansive interpre-
tations of § 924(c), Congress generally overrode each Supreme Court
decision rejecting the government’s interpretation.156 Most recently, in
149. Id. at 669.
150. 508 U.S. 129 (1993).
151. Id. at 136.
152. For a discussion of the incentives driving prosecutorial behavior, see infra notes 165–72
and accompanying text.
153. Walker & Patrick, supra note 112, at 3.
154. Id.
155. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 125, at 4. For a description of Operation
Triggerlock, see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
156. The decisions in Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 399–400 (1980), and Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6, 16 (1978), were overruled by the Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
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1998 Congress enacted legislation designed to “throttle criminal use
of guns”157 to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey.158 Al-
though this legislation could be seen as an affirmation that the gov-
ernment’s arguments correctly stated Congress’s intent, it seems more
likely that this legislation reflects the tough-on-crime politics of the
time.159
B. Underutilization of the Enhanced Penalties Under § 924(c)
In the preceding Section, I argued that prosecutors had overused
§ 924(c), adopting an unusually aggressive litigation strategy to ex-
tend that section’s reach beyond a natural reading of its language and
the central justifications for its enactment. The pattern of prosecuto-
rial efforts to expand the scope of § 924(c) to embrace additional
cases stands in apparent contrast to another phenomenon: the delib-
erate decision by prosecutors not to invoke § 924(c) in many cases in
which it is applicable. Several studies have documented the underu-
tilization of § 924(c). In 1991, the Sentencing Commission concluded
that § 924(c) was applied in only forty-one percent of the bank rob-
bery and drug-trafficking cases in which it was applicable.160 The
Commission documented what it characterized as the evasion of both
statutory and Guidelines enhancements. In field studies, Stephen J.
Schulhofer and Ilene Nagel found that federal prosecutors often en-
gaged in charge bargaining in which they agreed not to bring, or to
dismiss, charges under § 924(c).161 More recently, the Commission
concluded that in 1995 less than half of the defendants responsible for
the use of a firearm actually received an increased sentence under
§ 924(c).162
Laying aside the evidentiary problems that may arise in individ-
ual cases, there are two principal reasons defendants are not sen-
473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 1837, 2138, which makes the enhanced sentence available in the case of “a
crime of violence which provides for an enhanced punishment.” Id.
157. Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, 3469.
158. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
159. For a description of the political environment for federal criminal legislation, see gen-
erally Beale, supra note 85.
160. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 53 (1991).
161. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 232, 272–78 (1989).
162. The Commission concluded that between twenty-four and forty-four percent of the de-
fendants eligible for an enhancement under § 924(c) received an enhanced sentence under that
provision. Hofer, supra note 1, at 55. Because of the sample size, the Commission’s data had a
margin of error of plus or minus ten percent. Id.
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tenced under § 924(c) in cases that fall within the statute. One is that
§ 924(c) charges are frequently employed as a bargaining chip.163 Since
1995, charges under § 924(c) have been dismissed in more than half of
the cases in which a defendant pleaded guilty.164 Although any charge
can be used as a bargaining chip, the super-enhanced penalties re-
quired under § 924(c) give prosecutors terrific leverage in plea bar-
gaining. The minimum value of the dismissal of a charge under
§ 924(c) is a five-year sentence reduction, and when a second or sub-
sequent offense is involved, the minimum value of dismissal is a
twenty-five-year sentence reduction.
The employment of § 924(c) as a bargaining chip is not inconsis-
tent with prosecutors’ efforts to expand the scope of that provision,
since § 924(c) has more value in bargaining if it is applicable in more
cases. Moreover, although prosecutors do care about sentence
length,165 they care most of all about obtaining convictions.166 Given
that priority, prosecutors should predictably exploit charges under
§ 924(c) to obtain guilty pleas and avoid the possibility of acquittals.
The data support the hypothesis that prosecutors are using § 924(c) to
improve conviction rates. Since 1993, when the policy of the Depart-
ment of Justice gave federal prosecutors greater leeway to bargain
with charges under § 924(c),167 both the rate of dismissal of charges
163. Prior to 1993, Department of Justice policy seemed to preclude charge bargaining,
though the practice certainly occurred. In 1993 the attorney general issued a memorandum that
authorized more flexibility. Memorandum from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, to Holders
of U.S. Attorneys’ Manuals, tit. 9 (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 352
(1994). For a discussion of the prior prosecutorial practice and the Reno memorandum, see
generally Sara Sun Beale, The New Reno Bluesheet: A Little More Candor Regarding Prosecu-
torial Discretion, 6 FED. SENTENCING. REP. 310 (1994).
164. Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 125, at 6 tbl.5 (reporting dismissal rates ranging
from 50.3% to 65.7% from 1995 to 1998).
165. Scholars applying an economic model have assumed that prosecutors place a value on
sentence severity as well as conviction. The seminal study is William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971), which posits that the prosecutor seeks “to
maximize the expected number of convictions weighted by their respective [sentences] . . . sub-
ject to a constraint on the resources or budget available to his office.” Id. at 63.
166. See, e.g., EISENSTEIN, supra note 98, at 152–53 (arguing that “[t]he need to win cases
constitutes the strongest incentive in the work environment” of federal prosecutors); George T.
Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 121 (1975) (suggesting that
prosecutors develop a “conviction psychology”); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United
States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 967–68 (1997) (iden-
tifying an inescapable environmental pressure to maximize convictions that affects both state
and federal prosecutors). Prosecutors also place substantial value on the credibility they obtain
by avoiding defeats. Id. at 969 (citing Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary Sys-
tem, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 57 (1967)).
167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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under § 924(c) and the rate of convictions in the cases in question
have increased significantly.168
Though they sought to extend the reach of § 924(c) to additional
cases, federal prosecutors have refused to charge § 924(c) in many
cases falling within its ambit when they deemed the mandatory sen-
tence enhancements to be unnecessarily or unduly harsh. Because the
penalty under § 924(c) is mandatory, prosecutors cannot tailor its ap-
plication to a case once they invoke it, and its effect is unusually se-
vere. Thus the same factors that encourage prosecutors to seek en-
larged coverage to bring more cases within the terms of § 924(c) also
serve as a disincentive for invoking that provision, even in cases that
fall squarely within its ambit. In this respect, the behavior of prosecu-
tors is radically different from their civil counterparts in the private
bar, who have both an incentive and a clear professional responsibil-
ity to seek the maximum recovery for their clients. For a civil plaintiff,
another dollar is always a benefit, and one would predict that counsel
would forgo or dismiss civil charges that would increase the client’s
recovery significantly only for tactical reasons (and certainly not be-
cause of an equitable sense that a larger award would penalize the de-
fendant too much). In contrast, prosecutors are expected to do jus-
tice, a duty that does not necessarily translate into seeking the
harshest possible penalties in every case.169
This “reverse sentencing effect,” in which high penalties decrease
conviction rates rather than increasing them, has appeared elsewhere.
When penalties are deemed to be too high, prosecutors (as well as
police and jurors) may become reluctant to impose them.170 This phe-
nomenon, observed in the United States and England, occurs espe-
cially when officials and the public have not become accustomed to
new higher penalties.171
Both the rate of bargaining dismissals and the reluctance to in-
voke § 924(c) have increased as Congress has raised both the manda-
tory sentences under that provision and the severity of federal sen-
168. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 125, at 6 tbl.5 (noting that, since 1994, the
dismissal rate has been more than 50% each year, and conviction rates, which had ranged from
74.4% to 77.6%, increased steadily from 80.8% to 83.1%).
169. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2127 (1998) (asserting that prosecutors typically see themselves as
public officials making a decision that encompasses determining the “appropriate” sentence,
rather than necessarily seeking to maximize jail time).
170. Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2450–51 (1997).
171. Id. at 2451–52 (describing examples from various states and from England, and positing
a “lag of lore” theory).
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tences as a whole. Increased severity has raised the stakes in individ-
ual cases and increased the gap between past practices and the man-
datory statutory regime to the point that prosecutors feel real reluc-
tance to apply § 924(c) (and mandatory minimum drug provisions) in
many cases.172
Thus the super-enhancement of the sentence available under
§ 924(c) has increased the incentives for prosecutors both to extend
the coverage of the statute, pressing on the definitional boundaries,
and to bargain away charges under the statute, or, in certain cases, to
decline to bring charges under the statute. In contrast to Congress’s
intention that § 924(c) be a mandatory provision that offenders know
they cannot evade, that section has been left unused in the majority of
federal prosecutions where the facts appear to fall within its ambit.
Because the super-enhanced penalties under § 924(c) are so severe,
this expansion of the prosecutors’ discretion has two consequences: it
increases the prosecution’s leverage to compel defendants to plead
guilty to predicate offenses, and it allows prosecutors to determine
which defendants will receive sentences enhanced under
§ 924(c) and which defendants’ sentences will not be enhanced under
that section, although they could be.
This state of affairs is troubling for several reasons. It creates a
huge gap between the sentences imposed on the minority of defen-
dants, who are prosecuted and sentenced under § 924(c), and the
majority, who are not. The prosecutors’ largely uncontrolled discre-
tion in deciding whether to invoke or to bargain away charges under
§ 924(c) generates concerns both for the fairness of the process173 and
the reliability of the convictions obtained when charges under
§ 924(c) are bargained away. As in the case of other mandatory
minimums, the gun legislation actually undermines the uniformity
that was the goal of the Sentencing Guidelines regime.174 Indeed, as
172. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 1284, 1309–10 (1997); see also supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text (discussing
the reverse sentencing effect and the “lag of lore” theory).
173. For a discussion of the potential for unfairness in the exercise of discretion by federal
prosecutors, see generally Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to De-
fine the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995); Stephen
D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997).
174. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 89 (1991) (identifying two
types of disparities: first, defendants charged with similar offenses may not be sentenced under a
mandatory minimum, depending on variables such as race, circuit, and prosecutorial practice;
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Stephen Schulhofer notes, the Sentencing Commission’s own data in
the early 1990s indicated a troubling racial disparity, with white de-
fendants less likely to be subject to mandatory minimum penalties
than black or Hispanic defendants.175 Moreover, overbroad manda-
tory minimum penalties also create special hazards to accuracy in a
plea bargaining regime, insofar as super-enhanced penalty provisions
give prosecutors an unchecked opportunity to overcharge and gener-
ate easy pleas.176 This excessive plea leverage reduces the prosecutors’
incentive to separate innocent from guilty defendants at the charging
stage,177 increasing the chance that innocent defendants will be con-
victed.
CONCLUSION
Congress’s efforts to respond to gun violence have had far-
reaching effects within the federal system. The legislative efforts to
expand the boundaries of federal criminal jurisdiction to deter and
punish gun violence brought Congress to the threshold of a major
shift in the federal-state boundary. The Supreme Court responded
with its first decision in half a century limiting congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. This historic decision seems to have
been motivated to a significant degree by the Court’s institutional
concerns about a possible flood of federal gun prosecutions. Federal
prosecutors also have pressed the courts for broader interpretations
of the elements of the principal federal firearms enhancement statute,
generating an unusually large volume of litigation. Although prosecu-
tors were not always successful in this litigation, Congress stepped in
when the courts denied the prosecutors. At the same time as prosecu-
tors have expanded the statutes’ applicability, though, they have de-
clined to impose the mandatory penalties in the majority of cases fal-
ling within the terms of the statute. This surprising pattern of
underutilization results from prosecutors’ tactical dismissal of charges
in plea bargaining and their refusal to bring charges in other cases.
Where the super-enhanced gun penalties available under federal law
are employed in plea negotiations, they give prosecutors greatly in-
and second, that defendants charged with dissimilar offenses and having dissimilar roles in the
offense often get similar reduction).
175. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
199, 218 (1993) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 81–82).
176. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1963–67 (1992).
177. Id.
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creased leverage. In cases falling within § 924(c) prosecutors can
make offers that defendants cannot refuse, because the price of re-
fusal may be a mandatory consecutive sentence of five, twenty-five, or
even one hundred years. In many other cases, however, prosecutors
decline to apply federal enhancement statutes where the penalties
seem—to the prosecutors—to be unduly harsh. Thus the effect of en-
hancing the penalties applicable to gun-related crime has been to en-
large greatly the scope of the discretion exercised by federal prosecu-
tors and the magnitude of the consequences controlled by their
discretion, without the development of any additional checks against
the abuse of this enhanced discretion.
It is far from clear that enhanced gun penalties achieve their in-
tended purposes of deterring crime and incapacitating dangerous
criminals.178 Even if they miss the mark and have little effect on of-
fenders, the federal gun laws have had a significant impact within the
federal system, creating a backlash from the Supreme Court that may
tie the hands of Congress in the future, and creating perverse incen-
tives for prosecutors that result in greater inequity among defendants
as a result of mandatory sentencing provisions. More subtle changes
also may have been set in motion, as federal prosecutors seek to han-
dle the crush of new gun cases by wholesale cross-designation of state
prosecutors, setting a precedent for the delegation of federal prosecu-
torial authority to local actors.
178. See Hofer, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that most studies find that firearms enhancement
laws have no impact).
